When TotalEnergies Chief Executive Patrick Pouyanné urged Gulf producers to prioritise pipelines capable of bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, he highlighted a strategic challenge extending well beyond the recent Iran crisis. His remarks reflected a growing recognition that the resilience of export infrastructure may become as important as oil production itself in determining the future competitiveness of Middle Eastern energy exporters.
Speaking at an energy conference in Paris, Pouyanné described investment in alternative oil and gas pipelines as “an absolute priority”, arguing that the Strait of Hormuz has become a structural vulnerability rather than simply a geopolitical risk. The comments followed months of disruption linked to the Iran conflict, during which the waterway—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption normally passes—again demonstrated its importance to global energy security.
For decades, Gulf producers managed Hormuz-related risks through naval protection, insurance and strategic petroleum reserves. Today, however, energy companies and governments are increasingly considering permanent overland export corridors that would allow hydrocarbons to reach international markets even during regional crises.
The economics are substantial. Major cross-border oil pipelines typically require investments ranging from US$5 billion to more than US$20 billion, depending on capacity, terrain and supporting infrastructure, while development periods generally extend from four to eight years. Financing would likely require cooperation between national oil companies, international energy majors, sovereign wealth funds and long-term shipping commitments capable of underpinning commercial returns.
Saudi Arabia–Egypt: The Most Mature Corridor
Among the potential alternatives, the Saudi Arabia–Red Sea–Egypt corridor appears to be the most commercially advanced.
Saudi Arabia already operates the East–West Pipeline, transporting crude from its eastern producing fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. From there, exports could connect with Egypt’s SUMED Pipeline, which links Ain Sokhna on the Gulf of Suez with Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean through twin pipelines extending approximately 320 kilometres with a combined capacity of around 2.5 million barrels per day.
Unlike entirely new cross-border proposals, this route would build largely on existing infrastructure. Future investment would focus primarily on expanding interconnections, storage facilities, pumping stations and export terminals rather than constructing a completely new pipeline network.
Industry estimates suggest that strengthening this corridor could require an additional US$3-8 billion, with implementation possible within approximately three to five years, making it the fastest commercially scalable option.
For Egypt, the implications extend well beyond transit revenues. The country already possesses the SUMED Pipeline, the Suez Canal, Mediterranean export terminals, LNG liquefaction facilities, storage infrastructure and significant refining capacity. Combined, these assets position Egypt to evolve from a transit country into a regional energy hub capable of providing storage, blending, refining, petrochemical processing and re-export services for Gulf producers targeting European markets.
Iraq–Turkey: Existing Infrastructure, Persistent Political Risk
A second option would utilise the existing Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline connecting northern Iraq with Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.
The route offers one of the shortest operational links to Europe and has an installed capacity approaching 1.5 million barrels per day. However, years of disputes involving Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government and Ankara, together with repeated security disruptions, have undermined its commercial reliability.
Although exports have recently resumed, throughput remains well below design capacity, illustrating that political certainty remains as important as engineering capability.
Expanding and modernising this corridor would likely require US$2-6 billion and approximately two to four years, assuming outstanding legal and political issues are resolved. While commercially attractive, the route continues to carry considerably higher geopolitical risk than alternatives based on existing Gulf and Egyptian infrastructure.
Iraq–Syria: Strategically Attractive, Commercially Distant
Pouyanné also referred to the historic Iraq–Syria pipeline, noting that Total’s predecessors helped construct the original system nearly a century ago.
Geographically, a revived Syrian corridor represents the shortest direct route from Iraqi oil fields to the Mediterranean. Yet it is also the most difficult option to realise.
Years of conflict have severely damaged Syria’s energy infrastructure, while sanctions, financing constraints and broader political uncertainty continue to discourage international investors. Any revival would require extensive reconstruction alongside significant geopolitical normalisation.
Analysts estimate that rebuilding such a corridor could require US$10-20 billion, with implementation likely extending six to ten years even under favourable political conditions.
Although strategically compelling over the long term, the Syria option currently remains the least bankable of the principal alternatives.
The UAE Model
The United Arab Emirates has already demonstrated the strategic value of bypassing infrastructure through its Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
The system allows UAE exports to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, enhancing national energy security. Additional investment of approximately US$2-5 billion could further expand storage and export capacity within two to four years.
However, the Fujairah model primarily serves UAE production rather than providing a regional corridor capable of accommodating multiple Gulf exporters.
Infrastructure Is Becoming the New Competitive Advantage
Beyond crude oil, future corridors could eventually transport natural gas, hydrogen, ammonia and carbon dioxide associated with carbon capture projects, transforming today’s pipeline investments into broader multi-energy infrastructure.
While pipelines require higher upfront capital than tanker shipping, they offer lower long-term transportation costs, continuous operating capacity and significantly lower exposure to geopolitical disruption. Repeated crises around Hormuz have therefore altered the economic equation, increasing the strategic value of infrastructure resilience.
For Europe, the debate also carries growing importance. Following efforts to diversify energy supplies after reducing dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, additional Mediterranean export corridors would strengthen supply security and improve flexibility for European refiners without replacing LNG imports.
A Network Rather Than a Single Alternative
The future is unlikely to depend on replacing the Strait of Hormuz with one alternative route. Instead, Gulf energy logistics appear to be moving towards a diversified network of complementary export corridors.
Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure, Egypt’s SUMED Pipeline, Turkey’s Mediterranean outlet, the UAE’s Fujairah facilities and, over the longer term, a potential revival of Syrian transit routes could collectively provide greater resilience than any single system.
Competitive advantage will therefore increasingly depend not only on production capacity but also on the ability to deliver hydrocarbons through politically stable, commercially viable and geographically diversified infrastructure.
Among the available options, the Egypt-linked Red Sea–Mediterranean corridor currently stands out as the strongest near-term candidate. It combines existing infrastructure, comparatively limited additional investment requirements, established export terminals and direct access to European markets. Most importantly, it offers a realistic balance between commercial viability, political stability and implementation speed.
Patrick Pouyanné’s remarks may ultimately be remembered not simply as a call for more pipelines, but as an early indication that the Middle East’s next strategic competition will focus less on producing additional oil and more on building the infrastructure capable of guaranteeing secure access to international markets. If that transition gathers pace, the race will no longer be over reserves alone—it will be over the corridors that connect them to the world.
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